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The editors of this special issue have commissioned us to bring together 
some of the conceptual and empirical research presented in six intriguing 
papers that illustrate the widening scope of mentalisation. Using our summary 
as a starting point, we will endeavour to identify future areas of growth.  Our 
discussion will look at each paper in turn, but bring ideas and findings from 
the other papers into focus when relevant.   
 
The Evolutionary and Ontogenetic Origins of Mentalising 
 
Liotti and Gilbert’s (in press) paper is exceptionally thought provoking.  As we 
understand it, Liotti and Gilbert link attachment processes to mentalisation in 
an evolutionary rather than an ontogenetic sense: attachment processes are 
seen as an avenue provided by evolution for the recovery of mentalisation  
against a background of potential threats that can be mitigated by a relational 
experience of safety.  This perspective, in addition to more recent empirical 
findings from developmental psychology, has encouraged us to revise our 
views and consider alternatives.  Liotti and Gilbert suggest that the activation 
of the attachment system does not necessarily facilitate mentalising and the 
relationship between the two (what we have called loosely coupled systems 
(Fonagy, 2000; Fonagy, Steele, Steele, & Holder, 1997)) is moderated by the 
context and background against which activation takes place.  They helpfully 
identify the intense activation of the attachment system in the face of threat as 
a cause of inhibition rather than facilitation of mentalising.  This is consistent 
with our theorising based on neuroscientific observations which have also 
guided our clinical interventions (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004).   
 
In contrast to our attachment theory perspective, Liotti and Gilbert suggest 
that a feeling of ‘social safeness’ could be a prerequisite for successful 
mentalising.  For them, ‘social safeness’ encompasses a broader range of 
settings than those covered by the attachment construct.  Social safeness 
may arise from being in a position of authority, for example, which would 
promote mentalising according to Liotti and Gilbert’s model.  (Anecdotally, our 
encounters with Chief Executives of NHS Trusts do not confirm this 
hypothesized association.)  The issue they raise is complex and subtle.  
Interestingly, the paper by MacBeth and colleagues (MacBeth, Gumley, 
Schwannauer, & Fisher, in press) also reports that attachment classifications 
relate to different aspects of patient experience other than mentalising 
capacity (engagement with services and quality of life respectively) 
suggesting the absence of isomorphism. We are in agreement with the model 
proposed by Liotti and Gilbert, suggesting that the background to the 
association between attachment and mentalising is rooted in our evolutionary 
past.  We have suggested that the availability of the caregiver to the infant 
was a signal of environmental stress (Hrdy, 2009) that empowers infants to 
make adaptive choices depending on the circumstances in which they find 
themselves. Where caregivers do not have the time or resources to devote 
individual attention to their infant, the infant’s subsequent priorities may call 
for physical assertion rather than the kind of social collaboration which mental 
state understanding of others prioritises.  In environments where resources 
are insufficient for the population , relative inattention in the context of primary 
attachments prepares the child’s mind and body for violent competition for 
resources (Fonagy & Bateman, 2008).  Alternative, but incompatible, 
strategies for relating to others through intra-species collaboration, are 
sacrificed.  This, in our view, is the evolutionary background that biases those 
with a secure attachment towards mental state understanding.   
 
It is not our impression that Liotti and Gilbert would disagree with the view that 
there is an underlying relationship between attachment in infancy and 
precocious social understanding.  After all, this was first reported by Inge 
Bretherton over 30 years ago (Bretherton, Bates, Benigni, Camaioni, & 
Volterra, 1979).  Nor would we disagree about the accumulating empirical 
support for an association between the quality of children’s primary 
attachment relationship and the passing of mentalising tests (see de Rosnay, 
Harris, & Pons, 2008 for a critical review).  We certainly agree with the 
general stance in their paper that exploration and safeness in the human 
context encompasses the exploration of minds. Epistemic safety (or epistemic 
trust) in this context refers to the ‘social mentality’ of the environment that 
individuals find themselves in.  A secure attachment context then, where the 
caregiver shows interest in the infant’s mental state, can be expected to 
engender secure attachment and advance the development of mentalisation 
(Sharp, Fonagy, & Goodyer, 2006; Slade, 2005).  We concede that later in 
development it is not attachment per se but features of the social environment 
analogous to a secure parenting environment –particularly an adult mind 
taking an interest in a child’s mental state– that may be critical for the robust 
establishment of mentalisation.  Evidence shows that parenting characterized 
by authoritative rather than authoritarian practices and incorporating 
discussions involving affect, is associated with precocious understanding of 
mental states (e.g. Charman, Ruffman, & Clements, 2002; Pears & Moses, 
2003).  General characteristics of family functioning, rather than the quality of 
attachments per se, may be the primary vehicle whereby vulnerability to the 
loss of mentalisation under stress is generated (Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 
2007).   
 
However, before conceding the possibility of a direct link between attachment 
and mentalising, we would challenge Liotti and Gilbert to provide a more 
detailed and coherent account of recently emerging biological data, to which 
they allude, firmly linking the biological systems underpinning attachment to 
interpersonal understanding in terms of mental states.  Oxytocin, which they 
briefly mention, appears to perform a mediating function between 
mentalisation and attachment (Heinrichs & Domes, 2008).  A rapidly 
accumulating body of empirical findings has suggested that oxytocin 
specifically improves performance in mentalising tasks. (e.g. Domes et al., 
2008; Guastella, Mitchell, & Dadds, 2008).  Intranasally administered oxytocin 
also appears to improve trust, generosity and emotional attunement to 
observed suffering (Barraza & Zak, 2009; Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, 
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005).  We know also from both rodent and human 
studies that oxytocin plays a major role in attachment and pro-social 
behaviour in both animals and people (Insel, 2003; Insel & Fernald, 2004).  
Oxytocin is present at significantly elevated levels in women around childbirth 
and during breastfeeding (Macdonald & Macdonald, 2010).  More specifically, 
work from our lab suggests that mothers coded as securely attached on the 
Adult Attachment Interview prior to the birth of the child manifest higher levels 
of oxytocin when in the presence of their child (Strathearn, Fonagy, Amico, & 
Montague, 2009).  Similar associations were reported in experimental studies 
exploring the impact of oxytocin on the experience of attachment security 
(Buchheim et al., 2009).  Our own study monitored maternal  brain activity in 
response to distressed as well as happy affect expression on the part of their 
infants and revealed that expression of sadness on the part of the infant 
appeared to generate less brain activity associated with attachment in 
insecure mothers, and more activity consistent with a subjective experience of 
sadness. It is possible that oxytocin permits the individual to distance 
him/herself more from the affect they observe, and become aware of the 
mental state revealed by the other’s expression, as opposed to simply 
resonating with that state. In other words, it enables the caregiver to offer 
marked, contingent mirroring, showing the infant through her facial expression 
that she is aware of his state of distress but that she is coping with it rather 
than feeling it. By contrast, trauma and maltreatment appear to reduce 
oxytocin levels (Fries, Ziegler, Kurian, Jacoris, & Pollak, 2005; Heim et al., 
2008) and is known to be associated with impaired mentalising (de Rosnay et 
al., 2008).   
 
Thus we would suggest that the social mentalities model advanced by Liotti 
and Gilbert could be expanded further to incorporate the impact of neuro-
active hormones such as oxytocin that impact on brain areas associated with 
emotions and social behavior and no doubt they would have done so if space 
permitted.  We suggest that increased oxytocin in secure parental attachment 
while in the presence of the infant, will ensure a more mentalising parental 
stance, characterized by marked and contingent responses to the infant when 
the latter is in a state of high emotional arousal.  This in turn increases the 
likelihood of robust symbolic representations of self states being created in 
the child’s mind.  Second-order representations of constitutional self states 
ensure better affect regulation in interpersonal interactions.  This will 
contribute to creating a social mentality around the child that facilitates the 
development of mentalising.  Ultimately the child will show increased 
resilience to stressful social experience.   
 
By contrast, insecure parental attachment, linked to reduced oxytocin levels in 
the parent, may lead to non-mentalising (unmarked, non-contingent) parental 
responses to distress expressed by the infant.  We see such responses as 
undermining the natural process of maturation for mentalising by violating the 
infant’s and young child’s expectation of basic principles of reciprocity, 
fairness and rational action.  The infant’s failure to internalize self-states 
through interactions with the parent, creates a potential vulnerability.  
Mentalising can more readily go awry for these individuals, particularly under 
conditions of high arousal and threats to attachment.  Mental states will then 
be ‘enacted’ rather than experienced.  Such actions will have a destructive 
effect on the child’s social environment.  The individual’s actions can disrupt 
and distort social interactions, potentially undermining future opportunities for 
the development of mentalising and ultimately creating environments in which  
the social mentality does not encourage mentalising. This may be a source of 
concern in situations where the child’s mentalising resources are particularly 
called upon when caregivers and others are behaving in ways that violate 
‘healthy’ expectations.  The child needs extra resources if she or he needs to 
understand the motivations, thoughts and feelings of those who expose him or 
her to interpersonal adversity, ie attachment trauma (Allen, 2004).   
 
Mentalisation as a transdiagnostic concept 
 
Two papers in the special issue link mentalisation deficit to schizophrenia 
(Lysaker et al., in press; MacBeth et al., in press), one to borderline 
personality disorder (BPD)(Lecours & Bouchard, in press), one to obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder (OCPD) (Dimaggio et al., in press) and one to 
psychosomatic conditions (Vanheule, Verhaeghe, & Desmet, in press).  Other 
mental disorders could have been included, such as eating disorders 
(Skarderud, 2007), panic disorder (Rudden, Milrod, Aronson, & Target, 2008) 
or depression (Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma, & Target, in press).  In a unique 
empirical study Angus MacBeth and colleagues demonstrated that first 
episode psychosis (FEP) was not as strongly linked with insecure attachment 
as has been observed in samples of chronically mentally ill patients (MacBeth 
et al., in press).  Mentalising in the FEP group was unsurprisingly below what 
may be expected from normally developing individuals. Importantly, 
mentalising was negatively correlated with quality of life.  The latter 
association is interpreted by the authors as linking social functioning and 
mentalisation supported by other studies indicating difficulties in 
understanding mental states and impaired social and neurocognitive 
performance (Brune, Abdel-Hamid, Lehmkamper, & Sonntag, 2007; Lysaker, 
Dimaggio, Buck, Carcione, & Nicolo, 2007).   
 
Lysaker and colleagues (Lysaker et al., in press) have made an exceptionally 
clinically helpful contribution by presenting a clinically readily accessible 
assessment scale for metacognition (metacogniton assessment scale or 
MAS). The MAS may serve as a useful guideline for therapeutic interventions,  
which will help psychotherapists to avoid the iatrogenic potential of 
demanding a level of mentalising competence from a patient which the patient 
feels unable to reach (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006).  At low levels of MAS, 
where patients may not recognize their thoughts as their own or may be 
unable to distinguish and differentiate cognitive operations, it should suffice to 
intervene with reflections on the fact that patients have specific thoughts 
which belong to them, that they have intentions related to these thoughts, and 
to reinforce the clients thinking about their own minds.  At higher levels of 
MAS, therapists may create a safe yet provocative environment, conducive to 
a therapeutic dynamic which assumes that patients are capable of 
recognizing and reflecting on different cognitive operations. Where patients 
attain even higher levels of MAS, therapists are advised to encourage patients 
to recognize and distinguish different emotions. Only at high levels of MAS 
should cognitive therapists support patients in challenging their own thinking 
and trying to distinguish it from reality. 
 
Both of these papers on psychosis raise questions about  the trans-diagnostic 
character of mentalising.  It seems that shortcomings in mentalising 
characterize a range of disorders and bearing the patient’s capacity for 
mentalisation in mind may be just as helpful in psychotherapy for psychosis 
as for BPD (Bateman & Fonagy, 2010).  Of course, psychotherapy and 
mentalizing capacity are closely interlinked, and given the presence of a 
mentalising deficit, a therapeutic intervention based on symbolic 
communication which fails to take such limitations into account, is likely to be 
of limited value.  Yet seeing mentalising deficit as trans-diagnostic does 
indicate the need to consider its respective role in generating symptoms which 
are characteristic of a wide range of disorders.  In a Freudian model, anxiety 
has trans-diagnostic aspects as it is seen as a generic response of the 
patient’s ego to internal threat arising out of conflict (Freud, 1926).  We can 
conceive of mentalising problems as being a generic indication of mental 
disorder, regardless of the nature of the symptoms. Vanheule and colleagues 
(Vanheule et al., in press) begin their fascinating paper with the observation: 
“A substantial number of psychiatric patients find it difficult to understand what 
is going on in their own mind and body” (p. XX).  This statement may indeed 
be challenged.  Is it not the case that all patients with mental disorder present 
specifically because they find it difficult to understand what is happening in 
their mind or because those around them draw their attention to their difficulty 
in understanding social requirements that involve  taking the mental states of 
others into account (e.g. in ASPDBateman & Fonagy, 2008)?  Dysfunctional 
mentalising leading to disorders of self-experience occurs in all severe 
conditions that lead to referral for psychological therapy.  In Mentalising in 
Clinical Practice (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008) we boldly invited clinicians 
to consider mentalising as a foundation of psychotherapeutic treatments, 
arguing that this apparent audacity was justified since mentalising addresses 
the fundamental human capacity to apprehend our own and others’ minds as 
minds.  Patient’s hope that therapy will enable them to recover a ‘calibration of 
their self perception through understanding others’ views of them.  A generic 
aspect of mental disorder is the mind’s sense of lost capacity for coordination 
and processing in relation to the experiences it is generating both in terms of 
behaviour and phenomenological experience.  All the papers in this issue 
speak to this phenomenon in different ways.  The phenomenon is obvious in 
relation to first episode psychosis and the patient’s surprise and sometimes 
terror at their inability to attain a metacognitive understanding of the 
experiences generated by their own minds (Lysaker et al., 2005).  Perhaps 
the phenomenon is least obvious in the case of alexythymia (Dimaggio et al., 
in press; Vanheule et al., in press), where patients fail to develop appropriate 
emotional experiences in response to events in their lives and therapy 
generates a circumstance where they become conscious of and motivated to 
address this manifestation of their ‘loss of calibration of subjectivity’.   
If we accept that mentalisation is a core facet of psychological treatment, then 
it follows that we need to take patients’ experience of their own mental states 
into consideration, and with this we must also take on board their experiences 
of the thoughts and feelings of others around them. Finding one’s own mind in 
the mind of one’s therapist will invariably play a part in any mental health 
intervention. No patient is likely to undergo therapy without harbouring certain 
expectations in relation to the intentions of their treater.  Maintaining a sense 
of this process matters, regardless of therapist’s orientation or treatment 
approach.  Psychotherapists across modalities necessarily use this capacity, 
whether or not they conceptualize this explicitly in their theories, and good 
outcomes may be conceptualized in terms of improvements in mentalising 
ability.  Without attention to the patient’s need to see themselves through our 
eyes as mental health professionals, we risk harming the individuals who we 
have committed ourselves to protect. 
 
Mentalising as a therapeutic technique 
 
The focus on mentalising being a core principle of psychological therapies is 
in no sense coterminous with identifying a common set of techniques to assist 
in the recovery of this capacity.  In fact, it follows from the approach we have 
taken to mentalising that there can be no emergent set of techniques which 
limit the approach.  In this issue, Dimaggio and colleagues (Dimaggio et al., in 
press) outline an exciting new approach to treating Cluster C PD patients, a 
group generally regarded as difficult to access.  Meta-cognitive inter-personal 
therapy (MIT) shares many commonalities with MBT (Bateman & Fonagy, 
2006); but, whereas MIT  is designed specifically for clients with poor 
emotional awareness (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010), MBT is tailored for patients 
whose affect dysregulation represents problems.  Yet both approaches 
highlight a constant attentiveness to facilitating a cooperative alliance, 
creating a collaborative relationship and retaining a focus on moment-to-
moment changes in the nature of self-other understanding.  The approaches 
also overlap in looking to the therapeutic relationship as the most likely source 
of difficulty if the patient’s problems have not been adequately addressed.  
Just as in MBT, a structured, step-by-step procedure is provided for the 
therapist to follow.  Eliciting detailed autobiographical episodes, elaborating 
and clarifying these and gradually digging deeper in search of feelings and 
ideas as motivations for actions within the episode, suggests a very similar 
technique to that routinely used with borderline patients in MBT.   
 
There is a difference in aiming to elicit episodes as material to generate 
hypotheses about underlying interpersonal patterns.  It is not that MBT would 
not attempt to identify common patterns, perhaps driven by common 
relationship schemas, but MBT would not consider the generation of relation 
hypotheses as appropriate ends in themselves, but rather as vehicles for 
‘rehabilitating’ the patient’s capacity for mentalising.  MIT proposes that a 
change-promoting macro step of the therapy involves encouraging patient’s to 
take a critical distance from their schemas and find different ways to think 
about their problems (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010).  The aim, as with MBT, is 
the creation of more nuanced and varied self-with-other representations or, to 
put it another way, the enrichment of internal working models of relationships 
with more mental state contents.  At first sight this aspect of the work in MIT 
appears to hold the danger of precipitating pretend mode in the patient. This 
is something we have cautioned against in BPD and it is also likely to be 
unhelpful in OCD. So it is important to note that Dimaggio and colleagues 
state that the aim of the stage setting procedure, is to develop episodes ‘until 
previously unnoticed aspects of subjective experience appear’.  The general 
stance outlined by Dimaggio and colleagues (Dimaggio et al., in press) 
describes well the attitude that should be adopted by a therapist aiming to 
encourage the person they are with, to abandon rigid, schematic, two-
dimensional ways of seeing themselves and others, and to achieve a more 
complex internal set of intra-psychic experiences.   
 
It is exciting to read Dimaggio’s paper alongside the paper by Vanheule and 
colleagues (Vanheule et al., in press).  The roots of the Ghent approach are 
Freud and Lacan creatively integrated with modern attachment theory 
(Verhaeghe, 2004).  They identify a three step logic which is on the surface 
almost identical to the one proposed by the Rome cognitive therapy group.  
They suggest putting into words the chain of events that makes up the difficult 
situation, making the patient’s appraisal of the difficult situation explicit, and 
addressing effective responses and discussing the patient’s way of handling 
the challenging situation.  Asking open questions, summarizing the patient’s 
utterances, creating an ‘elementary narrative’ are almost identical to the 
technical recommendations that MBT considers acceptable to borderline 
patients.  Only in the third step of this therapeutic progression are bodily 
experiences, conflicts and self-reflection related to the conflict systematically 
addressed.  The beautiful clinical work included in the paper illustrates the 
tentative way with which the therapist approached Emma’s experience of 
distress and exploring alternative ways to fleeing troubling events. The 
reported approach to these patients also overlaps with ideas about the use of 
a mentalising approach for patients with eating disorders. 
 In patients with eating disorders, mental states are unable to achieve 
representation as ideas or feelings and therefore come to be represented in 
the bodily domain: “Physical attributes such as weight come to reflect states 
such as internal well-being, control, sense of self-worth, and so on, far beyond 
the normal tendency for this to happen in adolescence” (Fonagy, Gergely, 
Jurist & Target, 2002, p. 405). Mentalising treatment suggests an initial focus 
on the body, to stimulate the patient to investigate his/her experiences with 
body and food and gradually connect them with emotional, cognitive and 
relational experience, with the aim to translate them into a language which 
reflects upon them both as physical reality and as metaphor for mind 
(Skårderud, 2007). In our psychotherapeutic work with eating disorders, we 
explore triggers for bodily feelings with greater attention than with most other 
patient groups, identify small changes in mental states that can unsettle the 
patient physically as well as psychologically highlight patient’s and therapist’s 
differences in perceptions of the same physical events and bring awareness 
to the intricacies of the relationship between action and meaning. This 
process has  the potential to generate changes in bodily experiences and 
place affect relating to these into a causal chain of concurrent mental 
experience.    
 
The therapeutic approaches included in this issue, including our own, 
represent a minor subset of the unlimited number of strategies that therapists 
could adopt in the face of a non-mentalising patient.  In some ways this is the 
strength of mentalisation based therapies. The approach is pluralistic and the 
methods described in this set of papers illustrate this. Varied as they are, they 
all focus on the detailed subjective experience of the patient and do so in a 
measured way that is in keeping with the patient’s own mentalising capacity. 
Just comparing the three approaches presented here, we find a number of 
shared features which may well be necessary aspects of successful 
mentalisation-enhancing strategies for severe mental disorders: 
 
1)A structured, graded approach that holds the therapist in check and 
prevents them from making unwarranted assumptions about the patient’s 
processing capacities measured against their own mentalising ability.   
2) A focus on episodic memory as the most productive material to use in 
elaborating the patient’s self-understanding and understanding of others.   
3) An encouragement that the therapist makes few assumptions about the 
patient’s constructions, asks questions, encourages the patient to create a 
picture of inter-personal interactions and checks his or her understanding of 
the patient’s constructions by paraphrasing and putting into words a 
description of the patient’s experience.  
4) Therapists create alternative perspectives on mental experience, whether 
by addressing their relationship with the patient or by working with the patient 
to recover from misunderstandings or ruptures of the therapeutic alliance.   
5). There is a particular concern by therapists to generating a safe and 
sensitive interpersonal environment that may relate to the social mentality of 
the developmental phase of acquisition of mentalisation (Liotti & Gilbert, in 
press).  
6) Using the patient’s emotional response as a guide for focusing 
interventions on increasingly more difficult situations.   
7). Using normative understanding of behaviour rather than a theory-driven 
understanding of behaviour as the reference point for interventions.   
8) The therapist offers assistance with the patient’s regulation of affect in 
many ways, but mostly by implication through contingent marked responding 
to the patient’s affect and by creating a safe and sensitive interpersonal 
environment (Gergely, 2007).   
9). Some characteristics of individual interventions may run across modalities. 
Such characteristics include: (a) simple and easy to understand, (b) affect 
focused, (c) actively engage the patient, (d) focus on the patient’s mind rather 
than on their behavior, (e) relate to current events or activities – whatever is 
the patient’s currently felt mental reality (in working memory), (f) make use of 
the therapist’s mind as a model (by therapists).  
10) Therapists flexibly adjust the complexity and emotional intensity of their 
interventions in response to the intensity of the patient’s emotional arousal 
(withdrawing when arousal and attachment are strongly activated).  
 The assessment of mentalising 
 
A feature of all the mentalisation-based approaches presented in this issue, 
was the tailoring of the therapeutic intervention to the individual patient’s 
mentalizing abilities, at each moment and at each stage of treatment as 
described in earlier literature (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006)(Dimaggio et al., in 
press)(Lysaker et al., in press).  Two of the papers in this issue dealt with how 
to measure mentalisation.  Macbeth and colleagues (MacBeth et al., in press), 
as we have seen, used the Adult Attachment Interview (Hesse, 2008) in 
combination with the Reflective function coding (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & 
Steele, 1998)(Fonagy & Target, 1997).  In this respect, it is essential to realize 
that mentalisation is not a static and unitary skill or trait, and the AAI will only 
yield an indication of a potential for mentalisation which may or may not be 
fulfilled depending on the context (or social mentality Liotti & Gilbert, in press) 
in which the individual finds himself. Clearly, mentalisation is a dynamic 
capacity that is influenced by contextual factors such as stress and arousal, 
particularly in the context of specific attachment relationships (Allen et al., 
2008).  
 
Even more crucial to an adequate theoretical model is the recognition of that 
mentalization is a multi-faceted capacity. A most sophisticated demonstration 
of the complexity of the construct was introduced by Lecours and Bouchard 
(in press).  The ingenious model they presented enables the clinician to obtain 
an indication of explicit mentalisation in terms of verbal elaboration of discrete 
affects and implicit mentalisation in terms of the proportion that these affects 
may manifest in verbal expression.  The paper demonstrated an impressive 
association between the extent of verbal elaboration of a specific affect 
(sadness) and the endorsement of BPD symptoms by the patient.  The 
proportion of hostility directed against others as part of the narrative, 
appeared to be an implicit mentalising indicator of BPD symptoms.  It is of 
course striking that the two affect domains to yield significant associations 
with BPD symptoms, are indeed those that are most commonly suggested to 
be core to this type of personality disorder: aggression/hostility (Kernberg, 
Goldstein, & Carr, 1981) and affective disorder/sadness [McKiskal??].  
Although the theoretical framework from which the measurement approach 
derives is independent and was quite separately developed from ours 
(Bouchard et al., 2008), we see much in common between the respective 
consideration of emotion organization.  For example, the notion of non-
mentalised affect as unsymbolized and more closely linked to the bodily core 
(Marty, 1991) links to our assumptions concerning the embodied origin of 
cognitions (Fonagy & Target, 2007).  What we are particularly indebted to 
these authors for, is their presentation of the possibility that a patient might 
sufficiently mentaliseinsufficiently mentalize one specific emotional sphere, 
while doing well in another (e.g. mentalising the patient may mentalize well in 
relation to shame but not in relation to anger). This kind of affect related 
specificity is not open to global methods of measurement such as AAI based 
measures, but is obviously linked to the domain and context specific 
theoretical model advanced by Liotti and Gilbert in this issue.  Like all 
measurement systems, Bouchard and Lecour’s (Lecours & Bouchard, 1997; 
Lecours, Sanlian, & Bouchard, 2007) approach has limitations in that the 
quality of verbalization can only be judged on affect that is brought into 
discourse and thus it remains unknown whether affect that is not present in 
the discourse would have been verbally elaborated well or poorly,  had it been 
mentioned.  This does not detract, however, from the richness offered by the 
approach in this report elegantly identified core features associated with BPD 
regardless of more trait like measures such and alexithymia and demographic 
variables such as age having been controlled for. 
 
Mentalisation is clearly a complex capacity with multiple components which, in 
our view, are organized into balanced pairs of oppositions or polarities that 
underlie the quality of mentalising at any one time. Patients may show 
impairments in some of these polarities, but not necessarily in others (Fonagy 
& Luyten, 2009; Luyten et al., submitted) as a function of situational 
considerations, especially the social context they find themselves in.  Hence, 
impairments in mentalisation come in many variants, which necessitate partly 
different measurement and treatment approaches and affect and domain foci.  
A detailed knowledge of the specific types of impairments in mentalisation – 
and particularly the specific attachment contexts in which these impairments 
are manifested – may not only inform the focus of treatment, but may also 
inform the assessor and therapist of the type of relationship and associated 
mentalising difficulties that are likely to develop, and thus may serve as an 
important “transference tracer” later in treatment (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; 
Luyten, Fonagy, Lowyck, & Vermote, in press).  
 
In our view, mentalisation is underpinned by four functional polarities. each of 
which are related to relatively distinct neural systems. These polarities are: (1) 
automatic – controlled, (2) internally-focused – externally-focused, (3) self-
oriented – other-oriented, and (4) cognitive – affective, with (Luyten et al., 
submitted). These polarities offer a framework for understanding the way 
mentalisation relates to overlapping constructs such as theory of mind, 
empathy, mindfulness, alexithymia, emotional intelligence, psychological 
mindedness, and insight.  For example, while empathy is largely other-
focused, and builds on affect more than cognition, mindfulness tends to be 
self-focused and has more cognitive components. These oppositions 
represent balanced systems where a dysfunction at one pole may manifest as 
the unwarranted dominance of the opposite polarity.  For example, a 
dysfunction at the cognitively focused pole of mentalisation may manifest as 
excessively emotion focused mental representations.  Thus, in terms of 
manifest distorted representational content, inappropriate representations of 
emotional mental states may reflect normal affective mentalising that is not 
balanced by appropriate cognitive considerations. Therefore, an evaluation of 
an individuals’ mentalisingmentalizing capacity, depends on detailing their 
mentalising profile  –that is their functioning with respect to each of the 
complimentary pairs of components of mentalising, particularly since there 
may be dissociations between these polarities (e.g., impairments in one 
polarity, but not along other polarities)(Luyten et al., submitted).   
 
Conclusion 
 
This discussion and the papers in this volume point towards an almost 
endless research agenda.  Our knowledge about the extent of human 
mentalising remains rudimentary. The enthusiastic researcher can expand our 
understanding of the core polarities of mentalising itself, or increase our 
knowledge about its attachment and socially related development, 
neurobiology, and application to a range of disorders, either for the purpose of 
furthering our general understanding or for treatment itself.  An easily applied 
measure of mentalising capacity is urgently needed.  Finally it seems our bold 
claim that mentalising is not only a basic human psychological process, but 
also a core feature of talking therapies, is supported by the papers in this 
volume.     
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